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Since 2010, the United States and Brazil have made efforts to expand security 
cooperation between the two countries with the signing of a defense cooperation 
agreement, a general security of military information agreement, and the 
establishment of a defense cooperation dialogue. Despite these positive steps, 
the issue of technology transfer threatens to impede greater U.S.-Brazil security 
cooperation.  
Brazilian defense policy identifies technology transfer as a key component 
of its national defense, and there is a perception among many Brazilian officials 
that the United States is reticent to transfer defense technology to Brazil. This 
thesis includes an in-depth review of each country’s policies and strategies 
related to arms and defense technology transfers, as well as case studies on 
cooperation (or lack thereof) between the U.S. and Brazil in two areas—nuclear 
and aviation—to understand what drives this belief among Brazilian 
policymakers.  
The thesis concludes that historical events in its relations with Washington 
make it difficult for Brasília to accept more recent U.S. efforts to enhance security 
cooperation and facilitate technology transfer on their face, while these same 
efforts cause U.S. policymakers to discount the importance of past indifference 
towards or overt efforts to block Brazil in obtaining certain technologies. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since 2010, the United States and Brazil have made efforts to expand 
security cooperation between the two countries with the signing of a defense 
cooperation agreement (DCA), a general security of military information 
agreement (GSOMIA), and the establishment of a defense cooperation dialogue 
(DCD), based on the DCA. Despite these positive steps, the issue of technology 
transfer threatens to impede the progress of U.S.-Brazil security cooperation. 
Current policy identifies technology transfer as a key component of Brazil’s 
national defense, and there is a perception among many Brazilian officials that 
the United States is reticent to transfer defense technology to Brazil. What is 
fueling the perception that the United States is unwilling to transfer technology to 
Brazil? Is U.S. technology transfer policy impeding greater security cooperation 
with Brazil, or is this simply a case of misperception on the part of the Brazilians?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
It is nearly impossible to find a national-level U.S. policy document bereft 
of at least one of these terms: partnership, engagement, and cooperation. U.S. 
policy makers and military leaders alike clearly believe that our ability to build and 
maintain strong partnerships around the world is crucial to our national security. 
One country identified by name as a key partner for the future is Brazil. Indeed, 
the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) states, “We are working to build 
deeper and more effective partnerships with . . . increasingly influential nations 
such as Brazil . . . so that we can cooperate on issues of bilateral and global 
concern.”1 Likewise, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states, “The 
United States remains committed to building a strong partnership with Brazil—the 
                                            
1 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 3. 
 2 
hemisphere's second largest economy and second most populous democracy—
on all regional issues and global security concerns.”2  
An avenue for building and maintaining these partnerships is through 
security cooperation programs. Among other things, these programs: “allow the 
transfer of defense articles and services to international organizations and 
friendly foreign governments via sales, grants, leases, or loans to help friendly 
nations and allies deter and defend against aggression, promote the sharing of 
common defense burdens and help foster regional stability.”3 The 2008 Brazilian 
National Defense Strategy identifies the aforementioned form of security 
cooperation, called security assistance, with the inclusion of technology transfer, 
as a key condition for potential defense partners. The Brazil-U.S. Business 
Council notes, however, that there “is a widespread perception in Brazil that the 
United States is unwilling to transfer technology as part of its commitment to 
deepen this partnership.”4 Indicative of this sentiment is a Brazilian diplomat’s 
2008 statement to U.S. defense personnel that “the United States has carried out 
a technological embargo against Brazil for the last 20 years.”5 
Many U.S. officials struggle to comprehend this sentiment based on their 
view of the facts. As depicted in Figure 1, the number of cases of U.S. sales of 
military products, technology, and services to Brazil rose from 846 in 2007 to 
2,393 in 2012.6 Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, “the United States denied 
only 17 of the 6,900 defense-related export license applications for Brazil 
                                            
2 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2010), 62. 
3 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Security Assistance,” 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32437. 
4 Brazil-U.S. Business Council, “The U.S.-Brazil Defense Partnership: Moving Toward Closer 
Cooperation” (Washington, DC: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2013), 3, 
http://www.brazilcouncil.org/sites/default/files/BUSBC_DefenseReport.PDF. 
5 E. Richard Downes, “Trust, Engagement, and Technology Transfer: Underpinnings for 
U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation,” Strategic Forum No. 279 (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University, 2012), 10, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-27 .pdf . 
6 Brazil-U.S. Business Council, “The U.S.-Brazil Defense Partnership,” 4. 
 3 
between 2007 and 2011, a disapproval rate of only 0.2 percent.”7 Additionally, 
the United States’ bid to sell F-18s to the Brazilian Air Force includes robust 
technology transfer. Finally, the first meeting of the DCD in mid-2012 identified 
the transfer of science, innovation, and technology as one of six priorities for 
Brazil-U.S. defense cooperation activities.8 
 
Figure 1.  U.S. Military Sales to Brazil 2007–20129 
                                            
7 Downes, “Trust, Engagement, and Technology Transfer,” 12. 
8 Ibid., 14. 
9 Brazil-U.S. Business Council, “The U.S.-Brazil Defense Partnership,” 4. 
 4 
 
Figure 2.  Approvals and Denials of U.S. Military Sales to Brazil 2007–201210 
Thus, there appears to be a disconnection between perception and reality 
in the Brazil-U.S. bilateral security relationship, particularly as it pertains to the 
transfer of defense technology. To achieve the strategic partnership the United 
States seeks with Brazil, it is necessary to discover the source of this disconnect 
and develop strategies and policies to overcome it. 
C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES 
The preceding discussion leads to the formulation of the following problem 
this thesis will address: uncovering the reality regarding the issue of technology 
transfer in the Brazil-U.S. relationship. Thus rather than test a theory, this thesis 
will essentially be a fact-finding mission to understand the nature of the challenge 
of technology transfer between the United States and Brazil. Policymakers on 
                                            
10 Ibid., 5. 
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both sides of this debate could use the findings presented to evaluate, and 
potentially adjust, their policies in order to enhance the bilateral security 
relationship. 
There are three potential hypotheses that can be formulated to explain the 
disagreement or disconnect between the United States and Brazil over the issue 
of technology transfer. The first hypothesis is that U.S. policymakers are correct, 
that the United States is more than willing to transfer significant technology to 
Brazil, and that the issue is simply a Brazilian ideation. The numbers presented 
in preceding paragraphs regarding approval rates of defense-related export 
licenses and the details of the United States’ F-18 proposal to Brazil seem to 
support this hypothesis, but perhaps the denied applications are high visibility, 
high impact applications, so the small number belies the importance attached to 
them. 
The second hypothesis is that Brazilian policymakers are correct, that the 
United States is unwilling to readily transfer defense-related technology to Brazil, 
and that it carefully keeps the most advanced technology from being transferred. 
The 2010 Department of Defense’s (DOD) QDR lends credence to this 
hypothesis. Regarding security assistance and export controls it states:  
America's security assistance efforts remain constrained by a 
complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, 
unwieldy processes, and a limited ability to sustain long-term 
efforts. . . . Today's export control system is a relic of the Cold War 
and must be adapted to address current threats. The current 
system impedes cooperation, technology sharing, and 
interoperability with allies and partners, hindering U.S. industrial 
competitiveness.11 
The third hypothesis is that both sides are partially wrong due to 
misperception of the other’s intentions and actions. Robert Jervis’s writings on 
the importance of perceptions in international politics are particularly instructive in 
this area. Jervis argues that actors in international politics are subject to a myriad 
                                            
11 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, xiv–xv.  
 6 
of biases that cloud their judgment and lead to misperceptions about the 
intentions and actions of other actors. He offers several insights on 
misperception, two of which are particularly useful to the current discussion. First, 
he posits that what political actors learn from key historical events largely 
determines the way they interpret new information. This can be problematic 
because, as he writes, “By making accessible insights derived from previous 
events, analogies provide a useful shortcut to rationality. But they also obscure 
aspects of the present case that are different from the past one.”12 Thus, actors 
will often struggle to assimilate new information that does not support their 
prevailing view, and may either ignore it or manipulate it to fit their established 
beliefs. Second, he posits that events are more likely to shape present 
perceptions if they occurred in the “recent rather than the remote past.”13 Both of 
these aspects of misperception are likely at play in the Brazil-U.S. security 
relationship.14 
On the Brazilian side, historical events in its relations with the United 
States may make it difficult to accept more recent U.S. efforts to enhance 
security cooperation and facilitate technology transfer on their face, as will be 
outlined further in the following section. On the U.S. side, the salience of its 
efforts in the present to enhance its security relationship with Brazil may at the 
same time be causing its policymakers to discount the importance of past 
indifference towards or overt efforts to block Brazil in obtaining certain 
technologies. This third hypothesis—that of misperception on behalf of both the 
United States and Brazil—appears to be the most likely explanation for the 
challenge of greater Brazil-U.S. security cooperation vis-à-vis technology 
transfer. 
                                            
12 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 220. 
13 Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics 20, no. 3 (1968): 472. 
14 Ibid.; Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 220. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Paramount to the current discussion is an understanding of the nature of 
Brazil-U.S. relations, the sources of friction in these relations, and how the issue 
of technology transfer fits in to these relations. As a global power and the 
historically dominant power in the Western Hemisphere—both economically and 
militarily—the United States is clearly important for Brazil. With Brazil’s 
emergence as a global economic power, a regional leader within South America, 
and its well-documented aspirations to become a leader within a multipolar world 
order, it too is of ever increasing importance to the United States. In its task force 
report “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations,” the Council on Foreign Relations 
(CFR) concludes: 
Brazil matters not just regionally but globally. Its decisions and 
actions will affect the world’s economy, environment, and energy 
future as well as prospects for diplomacy and stability. Brazil is on 
the short list of countries that will most shape the twenty-first 
century. U.S. and Brazilian foreign policy must adjust accordingly.15  
The second sentence of this declaration could just as easily be applied to 
the United States as to Brazil. While this convergence in the importance of both 
countries in the world and recognition by U.S. analysts and policymakers of 
Brazil’s growing importance have led to efforts on both sides to find common 
ground and areas for closer cooperation, they have not necessarily translated 
into stronger relations between the two countries. 
A simple examination of the titles of essays and books on Brazil-U.S. 
relations reveal a common theme in the literature and provide a cursory insight 
into the relationship. Examples include: The United States and Brazil: A Long  
 
 
                                            




Road of Unmet Expectations;16 “Brazil: Ally or Rival?,”17 “U.S. and Brazil: 
Together and Apart;”18 “Inter-American Discord: Brazil and the United States;”19 
and “The Reluctant Partner.”20 Mônica Hirst’s conclusion in The United States 
and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations is perhaps the most succinct 
description of Brazil-U.S. relations that applies to historical relations, has 
relevancy to current relations, and captures the unifying theme of the literature. 
She writes:  
Brazil and the United States have shared a notion of ‘constrained 
discrepancy’ which, while it has always avoided open confrontation, 
has resulted in frustrations on both sides that have long dominated 
their relations . . . even though U.S.-Brazil relations have become 
more complex and diverse, the relationship tends to repeat the 
same pattern of (mis)understanding and mutual frustration.21 
Hirst outlines what she sees as four distinct phases or periods in Brazil-
U.S. relations: 1) alliance (The First Republic to the early 1940s); 2) alignment 
(1942–1977); 3) autonomy (1977–1990); and 4) adjustment (1990–2003).22 The 
first two periods are perhaps of greatest importance to the present discussion. 
She characterizes the first period as one in which the two countries formed a 
“special relationship” and essentially both sides met each other’s expectations. 
This special relationship or “unwritten alliance” ultimately led Brazil to side with 
the Allies in WWII, deploy troops to fight on the European continent, allow for 
U.S. basing in Natal during the conflict, and believe, as General Estevão Leitão 
                                            
16 Monica Hirst and Andrew Hurrell, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet 
Expectations (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
17 Russell Crandall and Britta Crandall, “Brazil: Ally or Rival?” in The United States and Latin 
America after the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 145–161. 
18 Ted Piccone, “U.S. and Brazil: Together and Apart,” The National Interest, 9 April 2012, 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/us-brazil-together-apart-6746. 
19 Peter Hakim, “Inter-American Discord: Brazil and the United States,” IPEA Boletim de 
Economia e Política Internacional (October 2012), 
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3115. 
20 Peter Hakim, “The Reluctant Partner,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (2004), 114–123, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033833.  
21 Hirst and Hurrell, The United States and Brazil, xvii; 67. 
22 Ibid., 1–18. 
 9 
de Carvalho declared in 1942, that it and the United States had formed a 
“brotherhood of arms between our two armies, on whose shoulders rests the 
main responsibility of the defense of peace on our continent.”23 
The special relationship, however, did not evolve as the Brazilians in 
particular expected, and thus the alignment period was key in the development of 
the perceptions and mistrust that have plagued Brazil-U.S. relations. Both Sonny 
B. Davis in “Brazil-United States Military Relations in the Early Post-World War II 
Era” and Andrew Hurrell in the concluding chapter of The United States and 
Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations note that Brazil expected its support 
for the allies in WWII and U.S. policies in the ensuing Cold War would bring 
“modernization with American economic and military assistance” and make it 
“become a full partner and become preeminent in Latin America.”24 The United 
States on the other hand expected a continuation of the status quo from the 
alliance period, with Brazil “bandwagoning” with U.S. initiatives and accepting a 
subordinate role in the hemisphere.25  
Thus while cooperation continued over the alignment period, the special 
relationship gradually eroded. Brazil politically supported the U.S. effort in Korea, 
but because the U.S. did not provide the massive aid it sought for its 
development, it ultimately did not supply troops for the war.26 In turn, while the 
United States initially supported the Brazilian military junta that seized power in 
1964 because of its renewed support for U.S. initiatives and economic 
liberalization, the Carter administration targeted the regime for its human rights 
record and nuclear development efforts.27 The Carter regime’s pressure led to an 
                                            
23 Ibid., 1–5; Sonny B. Davis, “Brazil-United States Military Relations in the Early Post-World 
War II Era,” Diálogos 6, no. 1 (2002), 14, 
http://www.uem.br/dialogos/index.php?journal=ojs&page=article&op=view&path[]=233. 
24 Davis, “Brazil-United States Military Relations,” 14; Hirst and Hurrell, The United States 
and Brazil, 94–101. 
25 Hirst and Hurrell, The United States and Brazil, 94–101. 
26 Davis, “Brazil-United States Military Relations,” 23–28. 
27 Hirst and Hurrell, The United States and Brazil; 7–8. 
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anti-American reaction from various circles in Brazilian society, the cancellation 
of the 1952 military accord between the two countries, and the commencement 
of a significantly more strained period of relations, the autonomy phase.28 Hirst 
and Hurrell’s book—along with Davis’s article—provides an important historical 
backdrop for understanding the challenges that face current Brazil-U.S. relations 
and the overall nature of the relationship. 
Several authors have written on the current sources of friction in Brazil-
U.S. relations. Russell and Britta Crandall, in “Brazil: Ally or Rival?,” correctly 
identify the most important elements of the relationship: economic/commercial 
issues and security/military issues. They argue that Brazilian foreign policy is 
primarily economically driven, while Brazilians feel U.S. foreign policy is based on 
threats rather than opportunities, which has led Washington to traditionally 
neglect Brazil’s importance and resulted in friction between the two sides over 
economic issues such as the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.29  
Along the same vein, Peter Hakim in “Inter-American Discord: Brazil and 
the United States” and Ted Piccone in “U.S. and Brazil: Together and Apart” 
identify economic issues as key points of contention between the United States 
and Brazil. They identify issues such as U.S. ethanol tariffs and cotton subsidies 
as sources of frustration on the Brazilian side, while import restrictions and weak 
intellectual property protections in Brazil frustrate the United States.30 Hakim 
notes that despite their many shared economic interests, the two countries have 
not signed a major economic agreement in over twenty years.31 Furthermore, 
Hakim and Hirst note that Brazil is increasingly looking inward to the region via 
vehicles such as MERCOSUR and outside the hemisphere to China and the EU 
                                            
28 Ibid. 8– ; Davis, “Brazil-United States Military Relations,” 29. 
29 Crandall and Crandall, “Brazil: Ally or Rival?” 145–161. 
30 Hakim, “Inter-American Discord: Brazil and the United States,”  0–98, 
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3115; Piccone, “U.S. and Brazil: 
Together and Apart.”  
31 Hakim, “Inter-American Discord,”  1. 
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for economic opportunities due to its frustrations with the United States.32 Clearly 
there are significant challenges in the Brazil-U.S. economic relationship. 
Where Crandall and Crandall posit that greater potential exists for 
progress in cooperation on security issues, other analysts note that there are 
several sources of friction in this area as well. Three issues stand out in the 
literature: U.S. military activities in the hemisphere, Brazil’s bid for a permanent 
seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and Brazil’s stance on 
nuclear issues. In Brazil on the Rise, Larry Rohter notes that among many circles 
in Brazil there exists a sort of national paranoia over the Amazon region and its 
resources stemming from Brazilian recognition that the country in many ways 
lacks the capacity to fully oversee or protect the region.33 This includes official 
reports indicating the U.S.-based environmental groups are simply tools of the 
U.S. government to extend its influence in the region and that the U.S. military 
has plans to take over the region.34 This concern extends to a preoccupation 
over protecting other natural resources, such as Brazil’s recently discovered oil 
deposits, as indicated by Brazilian participants at a conference on regional 
security in 2012.35  
These concerns, thus, cause friction when the United States increases its 
military activities in the region without consulting Brazil. For example, Kellie 
Meiman notes that in 2008, the United States re-established the 4th Fleet without 
consulting Brazil, drawing sharp criticism from President Lula and the Brazilian 
Congress.36 In 2009, when the United States and Colombia announced a new 
                                            
32 Ibid.,” 5; Hirst and Hurrell, The United States and Brazil; 17–38. 
33 Larry Rohter, Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 205–207. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Harold Trinkunas and Thomas Bruneau, U.S.-Brazil Workshop on Global and Regional 
Security, PASCC Report No. 2012 018 (Monterey, CA: Project on Advanced Systems and 
Concepts for Countering WMD, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 7, www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin GetTRDoc?AD ADA5745 7 . 
36 Kellie Meiman and David Rothkopf, “The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on 
dealing with partnership and rivalry,” Center for American Progress, March 2009, 8, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf. 
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military accord that included a provision for U.S. basing in Colombia, Hakim 
notes that Brazil led the charge in the region to block the agreement.37 
The issue over permanent membership in the UNSC for Brazil is a 
longstanding one in the bilateral relationship. The historical roots of this source of 
friction date back to WWI, when Brazil felt that its role as the only Latin American 
nation to provide troops to the war merited a permanent seat on the council of 
the League of Nations. Due to its denial of a permanent seat on the council, 
coupled with its observation that that the league ultimately did not represent a 
new world order in which its voice would be equal with that of European powers, 
Brazil withdrew from the League in 1926.38 The issue arose again following 
WWII, when Brazil expected its support for the Allies would elevate its power and 
earn it a permanent seat on the council. Patrick Stewart notes that President 
Franklin Roosevelt actually pushed for Brazil to gain permanent membership on 
the council following the war.39 However, debates over its status as a world 
power and having a Portuguese-speaking country represent Latin America on the 
UNSC led the Soviet Union and Britain to push in a different direction, ultimately 
granting a permanent seat to France.40 As Arturo Sotomayor notes, “Brazil has 
always regarded its exclusion from a permanent seat as a snub to be 
redressed.”41  
Over the years, Brazil has been a frequent rotating member of the council 
and many U.S. administrations have hinted at supporting its bid for permanent 
membership, but its use of the forum to counter U.S. initiatives has likely 
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impeded such support.42 The CFR posits that President Obama’s endorsement 
of India for the UNSC, along with his stated intent to “make sure that the new 
realities of the twenty-first century are reflected in international institutions . . . 
including the United Nations, where Brazil aspires to a seat on the Security 
Council,” bode well for resolution of this long-standing issue.43 Regardless, 
several analysts agree that the time has come to endorse Brazil’s UNSC 
membership, with Hakim and the CFR arguing that Brazil’s ascendancy to the 
council is almost inevitable at some point and that the United States could gain 
some goodwill by endorsing it sooner rather than later.44 
The friction over nuclear issues has both historical and current sources.45 
The Carter administration’s pressure on Brazil that ended the military agreement 
between the United States and Brazil also included efforts to block Brazil’s 
nuclear program; the military regime, however, considered its nuclear program 
an essential element of its national security doctrine and continued to pursue 
nuclear technology.46 Hurrell notes that Brazil did make significant changes vis-
à-vis nuclear non-proliferation in the 1990s by joining the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and signing the 
Tlatelolco Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).47 Yet several 
analysts note that Brazil’s failure to sign the additional protocol of the NPT, its 
support for Iran’s nuclear program, and its recent joint efforts with Turkey to 
broker a deal for nuclear fuel swap on Iran’s behalf, have been viewed with 
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skepticism and frustration by U.S. officials and called into question Brazil’s 
dedication to non-proliferation.48  
On the Brazilian side, officials resent the questioning of Brazil’s 
commitment to the non-proliferation regime. They contend that their support for 
Iran stems from a view that the arguments against it could also be used at some 
point to target Brazil’s nuclear program and that the NPT is discriminatory in 
nature, as non-signatories such as Israel and India have signed nuclear 
agreements with the United States and received U.S. assistance.49 Furthermore, 
as Sotomayor notes, Brasília perceives that the NPT and the additional protocol 
are overly intrusive, serve as a means for the United States and other developed 
nations to block the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to developing 
countries, and provide nuclear states “free access to the most sensitive nuclear 
technologies of developing states.”50 
So where does the issue of technology transfer fit into the larger 
framework of Brazil-U.S. relations? Hakim argues, “The central problem for 
Brazil-US relations has not been their disagreements. It has been their inability to 
find areas of agreement.”51 Several analysts and policy papers posit that 
understanding and overcoming the misperceptions on both sides as they pertain 
to technology transfer may open up an area of agreement and lead to an overall 
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improvement in bilateral relations.52 Finding common ground on technology 
transfer is something both sides desire and could lead to mutual security and 
economic benefits. In a fiscally constrained environment where the U.S. 
government is cutting back on defense expenditures, greater technology transfer 
to Brazil should result in greater sales for U.S. defense companies and help 
maintain the defense industrial base in the United States. Brazilian purchase of 
U.S. military equipment would increase interoperability between the two countries 
and lead to additional training and exchange opportunities that would likely 
enhance the bilateral relationship, at least at the military-to-military level. 
For Brazil, it helps them build up their industrial base, potentially creating 
more employment and wealth generated from authorized third-party sales. In 
security terms, by virtue of the United States assisting Brazil to modernize its 
military and thereby providing it the means to protect its natural resources, this 
could belie old fears within Brazil about U.S. intentions and pave the way to forge 
a defense relationship akin to the brotherhood of arms that existed in the early 
twentieth century. Additionally, as Hakim posits, “U.S. technology could 
contribute a great deal to accelerate Brazil’s development of a world-class 
nuclear energy industry—and could, over time, help increase Brazil’s support of 
non-proliferation.”53 
E. METHODS AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of four chapters. This first chapter was an introductory 
chapter and provided background on the issue of technology transfer, its 
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importance, and an overview of Brazil-U.S. relations. This chapter relied primarily 
on secondary sources.  
As this thesis is essentially a fact-finding mission to understand the nature 
of the challenge of technology transfer between the United States and Brazil, it is 
first essential to understand the policies of each country that relate to technology 
transfer. Thus, Chapters II and III of the thesis explore each country’s policy 
and/or strategy on technology transfer. To the fullest extent possible, these 
chapters rely on U.S. and Brazilian official policy documents and other primary 
sources such as official statements from officials in either country. These 
chapters also draw on secondary sources including writings by academics or 
entities with expertise in technology transfer or on either country’s policies 
pertaining to defense and technology transfer.  
In order to discover the sources of misperception over technology transfer, 
the fourth chapter of the thesis employs a comparative study. This chapter 
compares procurement and technology transfer efforts in two areas, nuclear and 
aviation, and relies on a combination of primary and secondary sources. It also 
provides a conclusion and presents the thesis’s findings. 
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II. U.S. POLICY 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of U.S. policies that 
have a bearing on defense technology transfer. It will begin by providing key 
definitions and concepts that relate to defense technology transfer. Since most 
defense technology transfer comes about in conjunction with arms transfers, U.S. 
policies that govern these transfers will also be discussed. This will include a 
description of the U.S. export control system and other international 
arrangements that have an impact on the transfer of defense-related technology. 
Additionally, the chapter will provide a brief history of U.S. security assistance 
and arms transfer policies and their effects on Latin America.  
A. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
As noted in the introduction, the U.S. government has placed much 
emphasis in recent years on engagement, partnership, and cooperation as key 
elements of national security policy, as denoted in high-level policy documents 
such as the NSS and the QDR. While accepting a continuing position of 
importance for the United States in the global system, these documents 
recognize the increasingly multipolar nature of the global environment and, thus, 
the need to cooperate with other friendly actors in the system to help ensure 
stability and protect U.S. national interests. The QDR notes, “U.S. security is 
inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies build 
their own security capacity.54 
1. Security Cooperation and Security Assistance 
One avenue the United States uses to pursue the objective of fostering 
engagement, partnership, and cooperation is through security cooperation and 
assistance programs. The DOD defines security cooperation as: 
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Activities undertaken by the DoD to encourage and enable 
international partners to work with the United States to achieve 
strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign 
defense and security establishments, including all DoD-
administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and 
security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, 
including all international armaments cooperation activities and 
security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military 
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and 
provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host 
nations.55 
Security assistance (SA), which represents a subset of security 
cooperation, is one of the primary vehicles through which the U.S. government 
and DOD pursue the building of partner-nation capacity. It is defined as:  
a group of programs, authorized under Title 22 authorities, by which 
the United States provides defense articles, military education and 
training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, 
cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and 
objectives.56  
Through SA programs, the U.S. government transfers, among other things, 
defense goods such as conventional arms and defense technology to its foreign 
partners.  
2. Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales 
Within the realm of SA, the principal methods by which foreign 
governments procure U.S. defense articles are foreign military sales (FMS) and 
direct commercial sales (DCS). Both processes are subject to a myriad of laws, 
regulations, and policies, which will be discussed in more detail in the section on 
the U.S. export control system. By law, most U.S. military systems can be 
purchased under FMS or DCS, though some more sensitive systems may be 
restricted to sale via FMS due to the greater level of involvement and oversight 
                                            
55 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Security Cooperation Overview and 
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by government entities in this process. When purchasing via FMS, a partner 
nation enters into an agreement directly with U.S. government. They follow an 
established process to generate a request expressing their interest in purchasing 
U.S. defense equipment. Entities within the DOD and Department of State (DOS) 
review these requests to determine a country’s eligibility to purchase the desired 
items. Once eligibility has been determined, the U.S. government can then 
acquire the items from U.S. companies and transfer them to the partner nation. 
FMS offers partner nations the flexibility of purchasing items using their own 
funds or those provided them by the U.S. government through assistance 
programs. Countries desiring to project a closer relationship with the United 
States may prefer to use the FMS process because of its establishment of a 
direct government-to-government relationship. Purchasing through FMS may 
facilitate closer ties with the U.S. military as well, by providing access to joint 
training and doctrine.57 
DCS offers an alternative method for foreign governments to obtain U.S. 
military equipment. Like FMS, any DCS purchase is subject to review and 
approval by DOD and DOS entities, with the U.S. firm obtains an export license 
to negotiate with and sell to the foreign nation. Under DCS, however, rather than 
negotiate directly with the U.S. government on a defense-related purchase, the 
foreign government negotiates the purchase directly with the U.S. firm that 
produces the desired item. With few exceptions, countries pay for DCS purchase 
using their own funds. DCS may be more attractive to countries interested in 
having a greater level of participation in purchase negotiations, purchasing 
nonstandard equipment configurations, or limiting direct interaction with the U.S. 
government. In countries where the U.S. is not viewed positively, “public opinion 
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may view a relationship with U.S. industry more favorably than the direct 
government-to-government relationship inherent in FMS.”58 
3. Technology Transfer 
Any discussion of arms sales or transfers to foreign countries must 
inevitably address the issue of transfer of technology. The sale of U.S. military 
equipment to foreign partners, whether it is through FMS or DCS, will involve the 
transfer of technology at some level. The most likely forms are technical data, 
such as manuals or diagrams, or technical assistance, such as training or 
instruction provided by U.S. military personnel or contractors on the use of a 
defense article.59 These types of technology transfer are often inherent in the 
sale of defense-related items, and the DOD and DOS take their sensitivity into 
consideration in determining whether to approve an FMS or DCS purchase. 
There are, however, other forms of technology transfer that can accompany 
weapons sales. 
Many foreign governments, including Brazil, have moved away from the 
traditional approach of simply purchasing and importing finished military systems. 
Instead, they now seek the transfer of the underlying technology needed for the 
development and production of military systems as a condition of granting large 
arms contracts to foreign producers.60 This type of technology transfer coincides 
with the following DOD definition: “Technology transfer is the process of 
transferring, from an industry in one country to another or between governments 
themselves, technical information relating to the design, engineering, 
manufacture, production, and use of goods.”61 From the U.S. point of view, this 
level of technology transfer, particularly in the realm of defense technology, 
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represents both opportunities and challenges that must be balanced when 
deciding what technology to transfer and to whom. 
Indicative of the balance that must be struck when transferring defense 
technology is the following statement in former President George H. W. Bush’s 
1991 NSS: 
The interrelationship of economic and military strength has never 
been stronger. Both are affected by the way technology transfer is 
handled, particularly with respect to export controls. . . . Loss of 
technological leadership can undermine military readiness and 
strength. Not participating freely in worldwide markets constrains 
economic growth.62 
In effect, the choice to transfer military technology comes down to achieving a 
balance between goals related to economic security and national security that 
may be at odds with one another. 
Taking into consideration purely economic factors, the impetus is strongly 
in favor of transferring arms and defense technology. In a fiscally constrained 
environment, such as the one the United States finds itself in now, the U.S. 
military will find itself obligated to reduce its expenditures on new defense 
technologies and equipment. These cutbacks have a negative impact on the 
economy in general and on the defense industrial base in particular. The transfer 
of arms and technology to foreign partners and allies, however, can help offset 
these losses to the economy and maintain the health of the defense industrial 
base. For example, Brazil spent more than 2.3 billion U.S. dollars on weapons 
imports from 2000 to 2010, but only 16 percent of that amount was spent on U.S. 
produced arms.63 Political considerations aside, by including a greater degree of 
technology transfer in FMS and DCS sales to Brazil, the U.S. defense industrial 
base should be able to capture a larger percentage of the Brazilian arms market. 
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There are some potentially negative economic impacts that can come 
about as result of technology transfers. Two related examples are reverse 
engineering and third-party sales. Russia has encountered these problems in its 
sales of fighter aircraft to China. In 1996, Russia agreed to transfer technology to 
China as part of the licensed production agreement for 200 Su-27s. Halfway 
through the agreement, however, China canceled the contract and subsequently 
began selling its own J-11B variant of the aircraft, which it claimed was 
composed of 90 percent domestic content, on the global market. Third-party 
sales of this essentially reverse engineered Su-27 now compete with Russian 
exports in the market.64  
Third-party sales also represent a potential risk to national security that 
must be accounted for in any transfer of arms and defense technology. The 
United States must take measures to prevent its defense technology and military 
equipment from being transferred to its current or potential adversaries. If not, it 
runs the risk of losing its advantage in the military domain.  
National security considerations can also work in favor of technology 
transfer. Arms and technology transfers contribute to the U.S. defense objective 
of preventing and deterring conflict. This type of security cooperation helps 
partner nations acquire and develop the capabilities they need to defend 
themselves, fosters relationships that can be called upon in times of conflict, and 
increases interoperability with U.S. forces.65  
The preceding discussion demonstrates the complex nature of arms and 
technology transfers from the U.S. to foreign countries. The policy promulgated in 
DOD Instruction 2040.02, titled “International Transfers of Technology, Articles, 
and Services,” effectively captures this: 
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Dual-use and defense-related technology shall be treated as 
valuable national security resources, to be protected and 
transferred only in pursuit of national security and foreign policy 
objectives. . . . The sharing of defense technology, properly 
controlled, is a valuable way to ensure our allies participate with the 
United States in future military operations. In applying export 
control and technology security policies, due recognition will be 
given to the importance of interoperability with allies and coalition 
partners and to direct and indirect impacts on the defense industrial 
base . . . the Department of Defense shall apply export control and 
other technology security policies and procedures in a way that 
balances economic and scientific interests with those of national 
security.66 
The DOD operates within the framework of the U.S export control system to 
ensure security cooperation involving arms and technology transfer strike a 
balance between maintaining U.S. military superiority and enabling foreign 
partners to meet their defense needs and operate effectively in concert with the 
U.S. military. The following section will provide a brief overview of that system.  
B. U.S. EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM 
This section will describe the U.S. export control system, as this system 
contains the pertinent laws, regulations, and policies that have a direct bearing 
on technology and arms transfer decisions by the U.S. government. Additionally, 
the section will address some multilateral agreements that come into 
consideration as well.  
The U.S. export control system is one of the most robust systems in the 
world. The system, which developed during the Cold War as a means to restrict 
the transfer of significant military systems and technologies to the Soviet Union,67 
has the difficult task of balancing often-competing goals of national security, 
foreign policy, and economic prosperity. The two primary laws governing U.S. 
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exports of defense items and dual-use goods and technology are the Arms 
Export Control Act (AECA), which is implemented by the International Traffic In 
Arms Regulations (ITAR), and the Export Administration Act (EAA), which is 
implemented by the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Figure 3 is a 
graphical depiction of the system and the DOD’s role in it. 
 
Figure 3.  U.S. Export Control System68 
                                            
68 Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), DTSA Strategic Plan 2013, 11, 
http://www.dtsa.mil/Documents/DTSA_Strat_Plan.pdf. 
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1. Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations  
Through the U.S. export control system, Congress has delegated its 
authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President. The AECA of 1976 
authorizes the executive branch to control the transfer of defense articles and 
services. Under the AECA, the president has furthered delegated this authority to 
the DOS, which administers the ITAR. The focus of the AECA is on exports of 
items that are specifically designed for military applications. The act delineates 
the general eligibility criteria for foreign countries to receive U.S. military 
technology and systems, defines the proper use of these items by foreign 
partners, and provides the statutory authority for the FMS and, by extension, 
DCS programs.69  
The ITAR represents the implementation of the AECA. It designates the 
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) within the DOS as the entity 
responsible for regulating the export of defense goods and services. The AECA 
mandates “that the President shall designate the articles and services deemed to 
be defense articles and defense services” via the DOS in concert with the 
DOD.70 Per the ITAR, defense articles and services are items that are 
“specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a military 
application,” have no “predominant civil applications,” and for which there is no 
“performance equivalent (defined by form, fit and function) to those of an article 
or service used for civil applications.”71 Section 121 of the ITAR, known as the 
U.S. Munitions List (USML), constitutes the list of items that fit this definition and 
are thus subject to export controls under the ITAR. The DDTC performs its 
functions primarily through its review of proposed purchases of items on the 
USML. Although some items on the USML have general “no-transfer” policy and 
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countries against which the U.S. or U.N. has an embargo are proscribed from 
receiving defense equipment and technology, in general, the DDTC decides all 
export applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the 
sensitivity of the items and technology, as well as the country of destination and 
its political, economic and security circumstances.72 
The USML divides defense items up into 21 different categories. The list is 
extensive, with categories including small arms, guns and armament, 
ammunition/ordinance, naval vessels, aircraft and associated equipment, radars, 
military training and equipment, chem/bio agents, and nuclear weapons and 
technology, to name a few. Even commercial satellites and their technology are 
covered in the USML, something that is not common in the export control 
regimes of other countries.73 Within the categories of the USML, some defense 
items—including all classified articles—are designated as “significant military 
equipment,” and thereby subject to special export controls and greater scrutiny in 
the licensing process. Of note, an item’s inclusion on the USML makes it 
automatically subject to ITAR export controls; the “intended use of the article or 
service after its export (i.e., for a military or civilian purpose) is not relevant in 
determining whether the article or service is subject to the controls.”74 
Additionally, ITAR controls apply not only to the hardware of items on the USML, 
but also any defense services (i.e., training or production assistance) and 
technical data that accompany the transfer of these items.75 
In addition to their provisions for the export of defense items, the AECA 
and ITAR also specify the need to conduct end-use monitoring of these items 
and technology for any approved transfer. Monitoring is conducted to provide 
“reasonable assurance that i) the recipient is complying with the requirements 
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imposed by the U.S. government with respect to use, transfers, and security of 
defense articles and defense services; and ii) such articles and services are 
being used for the purposes for which they are provided.”76 The DOS Blue 
Lantern program carries out the end-use monitoring activities of USML items 
transferred via DCS. U.S. embassy personnel carry out Blue Lantern checks in 
country, and discovery of violations can result in the rejection or revocation of 
licenses as well criminal prosecution. These checks are not random; they are 
initiated and carried out based on potential risk of improper end-use or 
unauthorized third-part retransfer. In FY2012, of the 706 Blue Lantern cases 
closed, 20 percent were found to be in violation of the terms agreed upon in the 
authorization agreement.77  
2. Export Administration Act and Export Administration 
Regulations 
 Arms and weapons technology are not the only exports the U.S. 
government regulates. Congress has also delegated its authority to the executive 
branch to regulate all exports from the United States to foreign countries via the 
EAA of 1979. Under the EAA, the President can restrict exports for three 
reasons: 1) national security; 2) foreign policy; and 3) short-supply. Though the 
act is currently expired, its power continues in force under a presidential 
declaration of national emergency and the provisions of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act.78  
The EAR implements the powers of the EAA. It designates the Bureau of 
Industry and Security (BIS) within the Department of Commerce (DOC) as the 
entity responsible for administering the provisions of the EAR. Most relevant to 
the present discussion, the EAR empowers BIS to monitor and control the export 
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of dual-use goods. Dual-use goods are defined as “commodities, software, or 
technologies that have both civilian and military applications.”79 Like the ITAR, 
which designates military items via the USML, the EAR maintains a similar list of 
dual-use goods known as the Commerce Control List (CCL). BIS reviews 
applications to transfer items on the CCL and monitors their use after transfer.80 
The CCL classifies dual-use goods into 10 categories: 0) nuclear and 
miscellaneous; 1) materials, chemicals, microorganisms and toxins; 2) materials 
processing; 3) electronics; 4) computers; 5) telecommunications and information 
security; 6) sensors and lasers; 7) navigation and avionics; 8) marine; and 9) 
aerospace and propulsion. These categories are further sub-divided into five 
product groups: A) systems, equipment and components; B) test, inspection and 
production equipment; C) material; D) software; and E) technology. Based on 
these categories and sub-groups, dual-use goods are assigned an export control 
classification number (ECCN), and the assignation of such indicates an item is 
subject to the EAR’s export control process. Along with the ECCN, the CCL also 
indicates the reason an item is subject to export control (i.e., national security, 
nuclear nonproliferation, etc.) and includes a country list that indicates which 
CCL items require an export license for each country. Additionally, even if an 
item is not specifically identified on the CCL, it still may be subject to EAR 
controls if the item is destined for military use or is being transferred to an entity 
that is a known or suspected weapons proliferator.81  
As with items on the USML, exported items and technology on the CCL 
must be monitored to ensure they are used in accordance with their licensing 
agreements and are not retransferred to third parties without consent of the U.S. 
government. The Office of Export Enforcement within BIS carries out this function  
 
                                            
79 Ibid. 
80 Ferguson and Kerr, The U.S. Export Control System, 2–4. 
81 BIS, “Commerce Control List Overview and the Country Chart,” October 2013, 1–9, 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_download/14-commerce-country-chart. 
 29 
through its Extrancheck program. Under Extrancheck, BIS Attachés, Sentinel 
Teams, and in-country embassy personnel perform end-use monitoring of dual-
use goods.82 
3. Multilateral Agreements 
In addition to ITAR and EAR controls, several multilateral agreements 
related to arms transfers inform and influence U.S. export control policies. While 
these agreements do not directly control U.S. exports of defense or dual-use 
goods and technologies, many of their provisions are included in the EAR and 
ITAR. Following is a summary of these agreements.  
a. Wassenaar Arrangement  
Established in 1996 and currently comprising of 41 signatories, the 
Wassenaar Agreement (WA) is an international agreement on the control of 
conventional arms and dual-use goods. Its stated goal is “to contribute to 
regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and 
greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and 
technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations.” The WA includes a 
munitions list and a dual-use control list that participating countries agree to 
control via their national export control systems. WA controls are reflected in the 
USML and CCL. For example, items on the “sensitive” and “very sensitive” lists 
of the CCL come directly from equivalent lists in the WA; many of these items are 
the software and technology designed for the development and production of 
other items on the list. Brazil is not a signatory of the WA.83 
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b. Missile Technology Control Regime  
Established in 1987 and currently consisting of 34 member states, the 
MTCR is a voluntary and informal regime whose signatories agree to control the 
proliferation of “unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of 
mass destruction.”84 The United States is a founding member of the regime, and 
the AECA mandates that controlled items contained in the two categories of the 
MTCR annex be included on the USML. The most sensitive items in the MTCR 
are contained in Category I, and the regime’s guidelines indicate “a strong 
presumption to deny” transfers of these items. Brazil is also a signatory of the 
regime.85  
c. Nuclear Suppliers Group 
The NSG was established in 1975, and both the United States and Brazil 
are among its 46 members. It is an informal association of nuclear exporting 
states whose goal is to ensure that trade in peaceful nuclear capabilities does not 
contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. “NSG members voluntarily 
agree to coordinate exports of civilian nuclear material, as well as nuclear-related 
equipment and technology, to non-nuclear-weapon states,” and to “offer 
nonproliferation and physical security assurances.”86 
d. Australia Group 
Like the NSG, the Australia Group (AG) is also a voluntary and informal 
export control regime. The group’s 41 members agree to control exports in 
accordance with a set of six common control lists. The goal of the group is “to 
ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use 
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chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment, do not contribute 
to the spread of CBW.”87 Brazil is not currently a member of the AG. 
4. DOD’s Role in Export Control and Technology Transfer 
Although the DOS and DOC are designated as the decisive authorities for 
approval of arms and technology transfer, the DOD still plays an important role in 
the process as depicted in Figure 1. The principal body with responsibility in this 
area within the DOD is the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA). 
DTSA’s mission is to, “Identify and mitigate national security risks associated with 
the international transfer of advanced technology and critical information in order 
to maintain the U.S. warfighter’s technological edge and support U.S. national 
security objectives.”88 Additionally, in fulfilling its mission, DTSA is charged with 
considering the importance of providing “capabilities to our partners and allies, 
including through the transfer of critical technology and information” and 
“sustaining a vibrant and innovative U.S. defense industrial base.”89 Its key 
responsibilities regarding arms and technology transfer include: developing and 
implementing DOD policy on technology security; reviewing export licenses from 
DOS and DOC for munitions and dual-use goods in accordance with the AECA 
and EAA and providing the consolidated DOD position (based on input from the 
various services and Combatant Commands) and recommendations regarding 
these requests; and ensuring the proper disclosure of classified military 
information as dictated by National Disclosure Policy-1, “National Policy and 
Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign 
Governments and International Organizations.” DOD’s support to the export 
control system via DTSA and other related organizations within the department is 
a key factor in the arms and technology transfer process.90 
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5. Criticism of the U.S. Export Control System 
Though a relatively brief overview, the preceding discussion highlights the 
complexity of the U.S. Export Control System and the challenges to efficiency it 
faces in light of the number of government agencies involved and the competing 
goals it attempts to balance. The system has thus been the subject of criticism 
from many actors involved in the process. It has been called “too rigorous, 
insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or any combination of 
these descriptions.”91 The nature of criticism depends on where one sits. As 
noted in the introduction, the QDR characterizes the system as a relic of the Cold 
War and criticizes it for being a stumbling block to effective cooperation with our 
allies and detrimental to the competitiveness of U.S. industry. While non-
proliferation advocates often support even more comprehensive controls, 
exporters in business and potential importers alike often complain that the 
system is too complicated to navigate effectively, and many importing nations 
perceive that the system denies far too many proposed transfers.  
While there are certainly some inefficiencies and challenges with the 
system, there is information that suggests it functions effectively. First, data 
indicate that the number of denials is actually quite low. For example, in FY2012, 
BIS processed 23,229 export licenses for dual-use goods subject to the EAR; 
less than one percent of these applications were denied. Similarly, DTSA 
reviewed 20,603 dual-use and 39,870 munitions license applications in 2012, 
and it objected to only six percent and less than one percent respectively. 
Furthermore, the United States dominated the global arms market in 2011, with 
its arms transfer agreements to both developed and developing nations valued at 
U.S. $66.3 and accounting for nearly 78 percent of all such agreements. 
Additionally, both the EAR and ITAR currently have standard processing times 
for approving or denying export licenses that are less than 90 days, except in 
cases of certain national security exemptions. These timelines include the time it 
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takes for DOS and DOC to forward requests to other agencies such DOD to 
include their recommendations. Finally, the current administration’s export control 
initiative, which will be discussed further in the following section, has resulted in 
many items being transferred from the USML to the CCL, thereby subjecting their 
export to a somewhat lesser degree of scrutiny.92  
Despite this evidence, many—especially would-be importers of advanced 
arms and technology such as Brazil—still express consternation with the U.S. 
system. The system is designed to generally restrict the transfer of the most 
sensitive technology, so the small percentages of licenses that are denied almost 
certainly fall into this category. Thus, any foreign entity seeking such technology 
will likely find the system frustrating. But there is another potential source of 
frustration for importing countries: U.S. foreign policy and its influence on arms 
and technology transfer. Over the years, U.S. presidents have enacted different 
foreign policies and used arms transfers as a key component of these policies. 
They have often used the provisions of the export control system to formulate 
their own arms transfer policies and justify restricting exports to some regions 
while permitting them to others in accordance with their foreign policies. The 
following section will provide a brief history of U.S. SA and arms transfer policies 
to show how these policies have shifted over time. 
C. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES 
Particularly since the end of WWII, the provision of SA to allies and 
partner nations has formed an important part of U.S. foreign policy. Policy in the 
SA arena, however, has evolved over time and across presidential 
administrations, thus at times both positively and negatively affecting certain  
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countries and regions’ ability to procure U.S. arms and technology. This section 
will briefly outline the evolution of U.S. SA policy, including key presidential 
doctrines and policies. 
1. The Truman Doctrine 
U.S. SA policies after WWII were formulated within the context of the Cold 
War. Ultimately, most of these presidential policies were designed to forward 
U.S. objectives of containing the spread of communism and isolating the Soviet 
Union. The first major SA policy in the post-war era, known as the Truman 
Doctrine, came in the form of a request from President Truman to provide 
substantial military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. Truman stated:  
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support 
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressure. I believe that we must assist free 
peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.93  
Following congressional approval of the Greece-Turkey Aid Act of 1947, 
the two nations received over U.S. $600 million in military and economic aid, 
nearly 1,000 U.S. military advisors went to the countries and established military 
advisory and planning groups, and they were given U.S. arms from surplus war 
materiel as part of what would become known as the Military Assistance Program 
(MAP). MAP would later be an important component of the U.S. involvement in 
NATO, and as U.S. stockpiles declined, SA would shift towards arms sales and 
technical assistance programs to NATO nations to assist them in their own 
defense production.94 MAP under Truman did not, however, benefit Brazil or 
other Latin American nations. Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Act in 1949, but this act did not allocate arms to Latin American countries as part 
of any aid package; they would have to purchase them.95 
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2. The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Kennedy-Johnson Era 
The potential for communist expansion in the 1950s led to the expansion 
of SA programs first under President Eisenhower, and subsequently under 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. U.S. aid policy broadened to support not only 
containment efforts, but also concepts such as forward defense, internal security, 
counterinsurgency, and nation building. Under Eisenhower, military aid was 
extended beyond the scope of strictly providing SA to allied nations to also 
include nations deemed to be friendly. Furthermore, the Eisenhower Doctrine 
asserted the U.S. right to deploy forces assist any nation in the Middle East 
requesting assistance to defend itself against aggression from a communist-
controlled country.96 
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations expanded this doctrine to 
provide assistance to other parts of the world. Kennedy initiated the Alliance for 
Progress in 1961 to provide greater economic and military assistance to Latin 
America. The objective of the program was to help stabilize the countries in the 
region to protect them against internal and external revolutionary threats, 
particularly against the export of the Cuban communist revolution. Though the 
program led to some additional assistance to the region, the program died out by 
the end of the 1960s as the attention of U.S. political and military leaders was 
diverted to combating communist expansion in Southeast Asia. During this period 
over U.S. $29 billion on equipment and aid was sent to Asia, most of it to South 
Vietnam. The Middle East continued to be a focus of assistance, but this 
assistance shifted from SA via MAP grants to SA via FMS.97 
3. Nixon Doctrine 
The enormous cost of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, coupled with 
domestic dissatisfaction with said involvement, led to a shift in U.S. foreign policy 
under Nixon that affected U.S. SA. The Nixon doctrine essentially stated that 
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while the U.S. would continue to be responsible for the deterrence of nuclear and 
conventional war, it was the primary responsibility of individual nations to protect 
themselves against internal threats and localized conflicts. The U.S. would 
continue to provide economic and material support, but the deployment of U.S. 
forces in these types of conflicts was to be significantly curtailed. The self-
sufficiency embodied in this doctrine further shifted U.S. SA efforts from MAP 
grants to military sales. Nixon criticized earlier foreign policies such as the 
Alliance for Progress, stating that these policies put the U.S. in a dictatorial role 
over regions such as Latin America and that his focus would shift to one of 
partnership. Conflicts in the Middle East continued to be of great concern to the 
United States under Nixon, and thus large amounts of U.S. military equipment 
were sold to primarily Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.98  
4. Ford and Carter Administrations 
President Ford assumed the presidency under difficult circumstances 
following the resignation of President Nixon. Among the challenges he faced was 
how to carry out U.S. SA under increasing demand for U.S. arms worldwide, 
coupled with growing concern within the U.S. Congress over the global spread of 
U.S. arms and technology. In 1976, Congress passed the AECA, which, as 
outlined previously, required greater scrutiny of arms and technology transfers by 
DOS and DOD; it also gave Congress the power to block certain types of arms 
sales. Thus, the Ford administration had to juggle its desire to provide arms to 
countries in Latin America as a means to promote goodwill and maintain access 
to the region, with the new constraints on such assistance embodied in the AECA 
and other congressional legislation. Additionally, media attention to human rights 
violations by Latin American governments led to both public and domestic 
concern over the spread of U.S. military equipment in the region.99 
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Against this backdrop, President Carter assumed the presidency in 1977 
and shortly after, in April of that year, issued Presidential Directive 13 (PD-13), 
“Conventional Arms Transfer Policy.” PD-13 represented a dramatic shift in U.S. 
SA policy and had a significant effect on the ability of many countries, including 
Latin American countries, to procure U.S. military equipment and technology. It 
stated:  
I have concluded that we must restrain the transfer of conventional 
arms by recognizing that arms transfers are an exceptional foreign 
policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be 
clearly demonstrated that the transfers contribute to our national 
security interests. . . . The United States will give continued 
emphasis to formulating and conducting our security assistance 
programs in a manner which will promote and advance respect for 
human rights in recipient countries.100 
In essence, PD-13 outlawed the provision of advanced weaponry to 
countries in Latin America due to the linkage between governments in the region, 
particularly military regimes, with unacceptable human rights records. 
Furthermore, it strictly prohibited the “agreements for coproduction of significant 
weapons, equipment, or major components, beyond assembly of subcomponents 
and the fabrication of high-turnover spare parts,” thus outlawing technology 
transfer of advanced weapons systems. Carter’s moratorium on advanced 
weapons sales to Latin America lasted 20 years, and its implementation led the 
Brazilian government to cancel a cooperative military agreement with the United 
States that had been in effect since the early 1950s. Despite the moratorium, 
however, the United States continued to be the largest exporter of low and 
medium level arms and technology to Latin America, and advanced weaponry 
such as fighters made their way to the region from other suppliers, such France 
and Russia.101 
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5. Reagan Administration 
President Reagan announced a new conventional arms transfer policy 
shortly after assuming the presidency. While it did not explicitly repeal the 
moratorium embodied in Carter’s PD-13, it did represent a major shift from the 
Carter era, viewing arms transfers as a “essential element of our global defense 
policy and an indispensable component of US foreign policy” rather than an 
“exceptional foreign policy implement.”102 President George H.W. Bush’s policy 
represented a continuation of the Reagan policy. Reagan’s policy stated, among 
other things, that U.S. SA would be used to help deter Soviet aggression 
globally, demonstrate the United States was a reliable partner and would not 
abandon its friends and allies, improve the U.S. economy by strengthening the 
defense industrial base, and strengthen the U.S. military by improving 
interoperability with other militaries and potential access to regional bases. 
During the Reagan and Bush administrations, DCS to Latin America more than 
doubled from the previous 20-year period, totaling approximately U.S. $1.3 billion 
from 1984–1993. The weapons and technology transferred to the region during 
this period, however, were not advanced, with the exception of the sale of F-16s 
to Venezuela; a move that was permitted in response to a Russian sale of MiG-
23 fighters to Cuba in 1982.103 
6. Clinton Administration 
The Clinton administration essentially marked the end of the Cold War era 
conventional arms transfer policy. In February 1995, the administration released 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-34) on Conventional Arms Transfers. While  
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not an extreme departure from the Reagan policy, Clinton’s arms transfer policy 
essentially summarized and codified both his and Reagan’s initiatives in the arms 
transfer arena. It stated: 
Sales of conventional weapons are a legitimate instrument of U.S. 
foreign policy, enabling allies and friends to better defend 
themselves, as well as help support our defense industrial base. 
The Administration is determined to ensure a balanced approach, 
supporting legitimate transfers while restraining those which could 
threaten our foreign policy and national security interests.104 
Additionally, Clinton repealed the Carter administration’s ban on the sale 
of advanced weaponry to Latin America. Recognizing that the political landscape 
had changed in Latin America, with democratically elected regimes in all the 
region’s countries except for Cuba, in August 1  7 released “U.S. Policy on 
Arms Transfers to Latin America,” which established “a process for case-by-case 
consideration of requests for advanced arms transfers to countries of that region” 
and put “U.S. arms transfer policy toward Latin America on a par with our policy 
toward other regions of the world.”105 The policies of earlier administrations, 
while still permitting arms transfers to the region, had led Latin American 
countries to have some of the least modern militaries in the world. The Clinton 
policy would ostensibly allow these countries to rectify this situation while 
improving interoperability with the U.S. military by allowing them to purchase 
advanced equipment that was still employed by U.S. forces. Chile was the first to 
take advantage of the change in policy, purchasing F-16s to modernize its air 
force. The policy of George W. Bush’s administration essentially represented a 
continuation of the Clinton era policy, while introducing new measures to arm 
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partner nations participating in the war in Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism 
and help fund counter-drug activities in Mexico and Central America.106 
7. Obama Administration 
The Obama administration has continued to view SA as a key foreign 
policy implement and maintained many of the programs of the Clinton and Bush 
administrations. One important, though as yet incomplete, initiative of the Obama 
administration is its Export Control Initiative. Proposed in 2010, the initiative 
seeks to improve upon the current export control system by eliminating 
redundancies and making the transfer and licensing of certain items, particularly 
dual-use goods, more efficient. It outlines a new system based on four key 
components: 1) a single export licensing agency to replace the current 
DOS/DOC licensing system; 2) a unified control list to replace the CCL and 
USML; 3) a single enforcement agency; and 4) an integrated IT system for 
processing licenses and maintaining a database of sanctioned and denied 
parties. As part of this initiative and its associated review, the administration has 
already begun transferring some items (i.e., Category VIII [aircraft and 
associated equipment]) and Category XIX [Gas Turbine Engines]) from the 
USML to the CCL, and it may likely permit the transfer of commercial 
communication satellite equipment and technology to the CCL as well. 
Ultimately, the Obama initiative should ameliorate the issues with the current 
system and ostensibly facilitate the transfer of higher-levels of military technology 
to countries that seek it, such as Brazil.107 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The preceding chapter has provided an overview of U.S. policies that have 
a bearing on defense technology transfer. Arms and defense technology transfer 
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are a key element of U.S. SA efforts and have been deemed a key foreign policy 
element by U.S. administrations since the end of WWII. The transfer of arms and 
technology is a sensitive issue, as the decision to do so involves the difficult task 
of balancing often-competing goals of national security, foreign policy, and 
economic prosperity. Additionally, this type of SA is regulated by a robust 
domestic export control system as well as multiple multilateral control regimes. 
Furthermore, U.S. presidents over the years have used the provisions of the 
export control system to formulate their own arms transfer policies and justify 
restricting exports to some regions while permitting them to others in accordance 
with their foreign policies. Thus, while it is certainly constrained to large extent by 
the laws in place governing transfers of certain arms and technology, it is not 
difficult for one to see how would-be importers of advanced arms and technology 
such as Brazil could believe that the United States is deliberately holding back 












III. BRAZILIAN POLICY 
In a 2013 commentary piece titled “Hardening Brazil’s Soft Power,” Celso 
Amorim, Brazil’s Defense Minister wrote: 
Is soft power enough for one of the world’s major emerging 
countries? To be sure, Brazil’s peaceful foreign policy has served it 
well. . . . Yet no country can rely on soft power alone to defend its 
interests. Indeed, in an unpredictable world, where old threats are 
compounded by new challenges, policymakers cannot disregard 
hard power. By deterring threats to national sovereignty, military 
power supports peace; and, in Brazil’s case, it underpins our 
country’s constructive role in the pursuit of global stability.108 
Amorim continued in the piece to explain how Brazil’s National Defense Strategy 
(END in Portuguese), originally published in 2008 and updated in 2012, focuses 
on the need for Brazil to “harden its soft power” through the modernization of its 
military forces and the strengthening of its defense industrial complex.109 
This chapter will provide an overview of Brazilian policies that have a 
bearing on these efforts and the role of defense technology transfer in them. It 
will begin with some background information regarding Brazil’s promotion of 
technology transfer to the developing world and the reasons behind this. Then, it 
will discuss Brazil’s defense policy, as outlined in the END, with particular focus 
on policies therein related to the transfer of defense technology. Additionally, the 
chapter will address how Brazil’s technology transfer policy strategy is 
implemented in its procurement programs as well as how technology transfer and 
defense modernization fit in to Brazil’s grand strategy. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The issue of technology transfer and its importance is not new in Brazilian 
discourse. Indeed, Brazil was a pioneer in pushing the issue of technology 
                                            





transfer from the developed world to the developing world. In 1961, Brazil raised 
the issue of the role of patents on technology transfer to developing countries 
before the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. It advanced the argument 
that intellectual property laws in the developed world often denied developing 
countries the technology necessary to fully industrialize and close the income 
gap with those countries. As a result, the UN Secretary General commissioned a 
study to explore “the need to revise international treaties dealing with intellectual 
property, and to ensure that there is a specific framework on technology transfer 
that promoted their (the developing countries) access to existing 
technologies.”110 The Brazilian proposal was a key factor in the creation of the 
UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 and led to the formulation of 
a draft “International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology” in 1 85. 
Though the code has yet to be officially adopted by the UN, many of its key 
tenets continue to form part of international trade debates and have made their 
way in some form into international treaties.111 
Brazil’s argument regarding the importance of technology to development 
is in line with some economic theories on the subject.112 For example, in his 
article “Globalization and Patterns of Development,” Jeffrey Sachs attempts to 
explain the disproportionate distribution of the benefits of globalization, noting the 
importance technology can play in reducing this disparity. He classifies countries 
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and resource developments. The five categories are: 1) endogenous growth; 2) 
catching-up growth; 3) resource-based growth; 4) Malthusian decline; and 5) 
economic isolation.113 
Brazil, by Sachs’s definitions, falls into the second category, catching-up 
growth, while the United States, falls into the first category of endogenous 
growth. Countries in the endogenous growth grouping generate a steady 
increase in income not based on capital accumulation, but on the basis of 
innovation. Countries in the catching-up growth grouping generally have a large 
base of human capital, have experienced capital inflows, and possess the 
industrial capacity to indirectly benefit from innovations. They do not, however, 
generate the same level of innovation as endogenous growth countries. Sachs 
notes that these countries are generally geographically proximate to innovators, 
making technological diffusion easier. Thus, though countries like Brazil have a 
lower level of technological innovation, they can often import technological 
advances from other countries and use their industrial capacity and large labor 
force to close income gaps with technologically advanced countries. Despite their 
growth and capacity to absorb new technologies, Sachs argues these countries 
must seek indigenous innovation in order to completely close the gap with 
countries in the endogenous growth pattern of development. This requires 
policies such as laws protecting intellectual property, government investment in 
science and technology, and creating economic institutions and laws that ensure 
greater technology transfer.114 In line with Sachs’s argument, current Brazilian 
policymakers recognize the importance of technology in the country’s overall 
development, and by extension in its ability to catch up with the developing world 
in terms of its defense industry and its military modernization.  
As with most Brazilian policy, there is economic motivation to transform its 
defense industry and modernize its military, such as job creation and profits from 
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arms exports to other countries. This discussion takes on a greater significance, 
however, when one considers the importance of military power and defense 
technology to a country’s grand strategy. Regarding the importance of defense 
capabilities and productive capacity, Michael Brzoska writes: 
The availability of weapons and the means to maintain them is a 
precondition for military policy and thus closely linked to the 
exercise of power and the conduct of war. A State without the 
means to produce the weapons deemed necessary to hold, and 
dependent on the importation of military goods, is in danger of not 
being able to conduct the kind of military policy it wants to 
pursue.115 
In short, if a country wants to be able to formulate an independent policy, 
particularly in the military domain, the capacity and technology to produce the 
weapons it needs indigenously are key. Though Brazil considers itself a peaceful 
country, as noted in the END, and has traditionally relied on soft power, 
statements such as the one previously quoted from Minister Amorim make it 
clear that Brasília recognizes today the importance of defense capacity to the 
achievement of its national goals.  
These ideas are prevalent among the political leadership involved in 
creating Brazil’s foreign and defense policy under the Lula and Rousseff 
administrations. These leaders, who Thomaz Guedes da Costa calls the class of 
1979, came into the government and military in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
experiencing “a period of numerous international constraints on Brazil’s foreign 
policy, from the oil crisis to debt negotiations, and the negative impact of 
technological relations with the United States under international control 
regimes.”116 The collective worldview among these policymakers, created by 
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these common experiences in their formative years, is perhaps best captured in 
a statement by Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, former Secretary-General of Brazil’s 
Foreign Ministry and Secretary for Strategic Affairs in the last year of Lula’s 
administration: 
The extraordinary international instability emanates essentially from 
the marginalization of peripheral states, that is, from the increasing 
gap of economic, technologic, military, and scientific power among 
states, and of the effort to preserve this situation. The powerful 
states are even more powerful and distant from the others.117 
This worldview has led these policymakers to pursue a foreign policy 
aimed at increasing Brazil’s influence in international politics as a means to close 
the gap between the core and the periphery, and its defense strategy has 
become an important piece of this foreign policy. As the Ministry of Defense 
(MoD) stated in 200 , “Capable of defending itself, Brazil will be in a position to 
say no when it has to say no. It will be able to build its own development 
model.”118 Military modernization, the revival of the defense industry, and the 
pursuit of robust technology transfer figure prominently in the Brazilian defense 
policy and are viewed as “intrinsically linked to national development.”119 
B. NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 
The END serves as the primary guide to Brazil’s defense policy. It can be 
viewed as the overall framework of this policy, outlining its key tenets and 
objectives. Technology and its importance in achieving Brazil’s defense 
objectives are prevalent throughout the document. 
The END begins with a discussion of the linkage between national 
defense and national development, stating that the strategy for one is 
inseparable from the strategy of the other. Technological independence is noted 
as a guiding principle in achieving both a strong national defense and 
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development project: “National independence achieved by an autonomous 
technological capacity building, including the spatial, cybernetic and nuclear 
strategic sectors. Whoever does not master critical technologies is neither 
independent for defense nor for development.”120 The linkage between defense 
and national development is not trivial. Brazilian politicians view national 
development as indispensable in Brazil’s pursuit to break into the top tier of 
global powers. If they view development of a strong national defense project, with 
technology as a driver and a critical factor in attaining that goal, there is a much 
stronger likelihood that the objectives and principles set forth in the END will be 
adhered to, particularly those involving the acquisition of technology.  
Likewise, technology is an important piece of the document’s early 
discussion of the nature and scope of the END. The END focuses on three key 
objectives: 1) modernization and reorganization of the Brazilian military; 2) 
reorganization and revitalization of the Brazilian defense industry “in order to 
ensure that the equipment needs of the Armed Forces are met and be based on 
technologies that are domestically mastered”121; and 3) adoption of compulsory 
military service. Technology certainly has a role in achieving the first two 
objectives. Technology transfer in conjunction with arms purchases allows Brazil 
to potentially modernize more quickly and subsequently reduce its reliance on 
foreign products by incorporating obtained technology into its own defense 
production for use by its own military and for export. This being the case, 
obtaining and developing defense technology figure prominently throughout most 
sections of the END. Some important examples include:  
 Under the END’s guidelines, there is a stated objective “To qualify 
the national defense industry so that it conquers the necessary 
autonomy in indispensable technologies to defense purposes.”122 
This is to be achieved by creating special regulatory and tax 
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regimes that protect national defense companies, allowing them to 
compete with international firms, and by seeking defense 
partnerships aimed at “developing the technological capacity and 
the making of national defense products to gradually rule out the 
need to purchase imported services and products.”123  
 Under the Navy section, it states, “Brazil will maintain and develop 
its ability to design and manufacture both conventional and nuclear-
propelled submarines. It will speed up investments and the 
necessary partnerships to run the nuclear-propelled submarine 
project.”124 The nuclear theme is expanded in the section on the 
strategic sectors, which notes that Brazil should aggressively 
pursue “the full nationalization and the development – at industrial 
scale – of the fuel cycle (including gasification and enrichment) and 
of the reactor construction technology for exclusive use of the 
country” and the development of nuclear power plants under 
national control.125 
 Under the Army section, it discusses that service’s primary role in 
monitoring and controlling the nation’s territory and stresses the 
need to obtain and develop satellite and cybernetic technologies to 
do so.126  
 Under the Air Force section, it notes, “The national defense industry 
will be instructed to give the highest priority to the development of 
the necessary technologies, including those that promote 
independence from the GPS system, or from any other alien 
positioning system.”127 Furthermore, it stresses the necessity to 
develop military and civilian personnel with technical knowledge “in 
order to reach technological independence.” Finally, it notes that 
any procurement program to upgrade the Air Force’s fighter fleet 
must include some form of offset in terms of technology transfer 
and licensed production in Brazil.128 
 Under the section on the reorganization of the defense industry, the 
END notes that “the development of independent technological 
capacities”129 is a guiding principle for that reorganization. Given 
that “technological blocks imposed by developed countries, 
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delaying the strategic projects conceived by Brazil”130 are signaled 
as one the main vulnerabilities of the country’s defense structure, 
“linking the purchasing of defense products overseas to the 
substantial technology transfer, including through partnership 
arrangements for the research and manufacturing in Brazil of part 
of these products or their substitutes,”131 is indicated as an 
essential part the defense reorganization project. 
The noted examples are not meant provide an exhaustive list of all 
mentions of technology in the END, but are meant to demonstrate how 
technology and its importance are interwoven throughout various sections of the 
strategy, thus demonstrating the importance defense policymakers in Brazil 
assign to the technical realm. A study of the END reveals recognition among 
these leaders that the desired transformation of both the Brazilian armed forces 
and the industry that supports them will require foreign technological assistance 
in the near term and technological independence in the long term. 
1. Criticism of the National Defense Strategy 
Though the END is an important document, was lauded at the time of its 
release as evidence of a new era of consistent Brazilian defense policy dictated 
by the MoD, and should guide the country’s future actions in the defense 
realm,132 it is not without criticism or detractors. One criticism of the document 
relates to the fact that it was originally the product of a presidential decree law. 
Presidential decree laws in Brazil do not have to be approved by the Brazilian 
congress. As such, the Brazilian congress is not required to abide by or follow 
the strategy. In light of the fact that congress holds the purse strings, this can 
obviously be problematic, as it is under no obligation to allocate the funds 
needed to achieve the goals set forth in the END. Given this constraint, some 
academics have expressed doubt the document’s utility in truly understanding 
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Brazilian efforts in the defense arena.133 The END was, however, approved by 
the Brazilian Congress in September 2013, and Thomas Bruneau notes that this 
development may improve the MoD’s ability to achieve the goals set forth in the 
strategy.134 
Another criticism of the END relates to the Brazilian defense budget and 
defense spending. The objectives in the END are ambitious and require a 
consistent level of defense spending. While Brazil continues to be the largest 
spender on defense in Latin American, with its spending representing more than 
51 percent of total spending in the region, its growth in spending in 2012 was a 
mere 1.5 percent, compared to the regional average of 4.4 percent.135 
Furthermore, despite statements from defense officials such as Minister Amorim 
that Brazil’s defense spending should increase gradually to approximately two 
percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to meet its defense objectives, in 
2012 and 2013, spending stood at merely 1.2 percent of GDP and appears on 
track to continue at that level through 2017 due to slowing of the Brazilian 
economy and focus on other national priorities.136 Additionally, the Brazilian 
defense budget is heavily burdened by personnel costs. Approximately 75 
percent of the budget is consumed by these costs, with 50 percent going to 
paying the pensions of retired military personnel and another 25 percent going to 
pay the salaries of active personnel. Another 15–17 percent is allocated to 
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operational costs, thereby leaving roughly 13–15 percent to be spent on the 
procurement and R&D initiatives that figure prominently in the END.137  
Despite the aforementioned critiques, there are reasons to believe that at 
least the procurement, technology transfer, and defense industry related 
objectives of the END will be pursued and dictate future defense policy. For 
example, recent cuts in Brazilian defense spending have been taken out of 
primarily operational costs, with procurement spending being kept at consistent 
levels. Additionally, the military’s procurement budget increased from 
approximately U.S. $3.7 billion in 2012 to U.S. $4.4 billion in 2013. Furthermore, 
defense procurement budgets are being propped up by off-budget funds. The 
Brazilian MoD announced in 2012 that the government had allocated an 
additional U.S. $733 million for defense equipment procurement from the 
country’s U.S. $4 billion Accelerated Growth Program. The Brazilian Financing 
Agency for Innovation also promised to invest U.S. $1.43 billion in the defense 
industry from 2013 to 2017 to support defense technology development. Finally, 
in 2012, Brazilian lawmakers passed Law 12.598/2012, establishing the Special 
Tax Regime for the Defense Industry. Under the law, companies deemed to be 
strategic defense companies enjoy special tax breaks for a defined period and 
export credit guarantees.138 These facts, along with Brazil’s offset policy and the 
Brazilian defense industry’s importance to its grand strategy, lend credence to 
the END’s position as a credible policy document. 
C. OFFSET POLICY  
Regarding the procurement of defense products, the END states that the 
goal is to: 
(a) optimize the expenditure of funds; (b) ensure that purchases 
comply with the guidelines of the National Defense Strategy and its 
development over time; and (c) ensure, in purchase decisions, the 
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primacy of commitment to the development of technological 
capabilities in national defense products.139  
One way that Brazil achieves this stated goal is through its offset policy. In DOD 
parlance, offset is defined as: 
A general type of industrial or commercial compensation practice 
required of a contractor by a purchasing government as a condition 
for the purchase of defense articles/services. The form of 
compensation, which generally offsets a specific percentage of the 
cost of the purchase, is directly associated with the items 
purchased, such as the production of components in the 
purchasing country for installation in the purchased end-item.140 
In short, offset is the practice in procurement of structuring purchase 
contracts so that some form of compensation offsets the cost of the items being 
purchased. Through offset in the form of technology transfer and industrial 
participation from foreign forms with Brazilian strategic defense companies, 
Brazil aims to improve its domestic defense industry and achieve technological 
independence in the defense realm. An effective offset policy can ensure Brazil is 
able to achieve its military and defense industry modernization projects even in a 
fiscally constrained environment.  
The MoD and the military services prioritize offset in all major procurement 
programs, and the government has taken steps in recent years to codify and 
consolidate this practice. Offset is required for any procurement contract valued 
over U.S. $5 million, and the goal is always for the offset return to be 100 percent 
of the value of the contract, though this is not currently mandated by law. In 
200 , a decree amending the 2008 END mandated that “substantial elements of 
R&D must take place within Brazil for all defense equipment procured from 
foreign companies.”141 Additionally, in 2013, Brazil announced plans to establish 
the Defense Trading Organization, under the MoD; it is expected to be stood up 
                                            
139 Smith, “IHS Jane’s Navigating the Emerging Markets: Brazil,” 23. 
140 DSCA, DSCA Manual 5105.38-M: Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), 
ESAAM Glossary, http://www.samm.dsca.mil/listing/esamm-glossary. 
141 Smith, “IHS Jane’s Navigating the Emerging Markets: Brazil,” 2 . 
 54 
officially in 2014 and will act as the central coordinating body for defense-related 
offset programs, replacing the current structure that allows the services to 
manage offsets for their individual procurement programs. Finally, competition for 
Brazil’s largest procurement programs reveals its emphasis on offset. For 
example, the three finalists for Brazil’s F-X2 fighter program all included 
substantial technology transfer and licensed production as part of their bids, as 
well as cooperation in other Brazilian defense projects such as Embraer’s KC-
390 transport/tanker program.142 
D. BRAZILIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND GRAND STRATEGY 
The Brazilian arms industry emerged in the 1960s, before which time 
Brazil imported the bulk of its military equipment from the United States. U.S. 
preoccupation with Southeast Asia and its denial of certain weapons systems to 
Brazil, led Brazilian policymakers to recognize a need for greater autonomy in 
arms production in order to meet the needs of its own military. The initiative to 
build the industry was also driven by the prospect of economic benefits from the 
export of defense goods. The defense industry grew significantly in the 1970s 
and 1980s, primarily based on the export of weapons systems to the Middle 
East. Regarding the industry’s success in that era, Luis Bitencourt notes:  
The reason they got that market was mainly due to good sales 
packages, to offer low or medium technological weapons, and . . . 
the sales were not based on any ideological or political position, nor 
did the sales’ contracts impose any constraints on the use of the 
equipment.143 
Against this backdrop, Brazil became the largest exporter of wheeled armored 
vehicles and ranked in the top 10 of arms exporters in the late 1980s.144  
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The end of the Iran-Iraq war along with the Persian Gulf War and Desert 
Storm proved nearly disastrous to the Brazilian defense industry. Iraq defaulted 
on repayment of its loans to Brazilian defense firms, eventually leading Engesa—
once the largest Brazilian defense firm—to declare bankruptcy in 1993. The use 
and effectiveness of high tech weapons employed by the U.S. military in Desert 
Storm and the Persian Gulf War caused a shift in demand in the export market, 
away from the low to medium-tech weapons being produce in Brazil. From that 
time forward, United States dominated the Middle East market, and other 
suppliers with high-tech weaponry took over Brazil’s market share. As of 2011, 
Brazil was ranked twenty-seventh in the world among arms exporting countries 
with a mere 0.1 percent of the worldwide exports compared to a combined 59.6 
percent held by the United States and Russia (see Table 1).145  
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Table 1.   Brazil’s Ranking Among the World’s Major Arms Exporters146 
In “The Brazilian Defense Industry and the International System,” Ethan 
Kapstein argues that the development of the Brazilian defense industrial base 
was not based solely on economic considerations, but was intrinsically linked to 
the country’s international aspirations. He writes:  
The industry developed as a manifestation of Brazil's self-conscious 
attempt to become an independent force in world politics and 
primus inter pares in the Third World context. . . . In short, Brazil 
has viewed an indigenous arms industry as crucial to its project of 
building political power.147  
Brazil’s current efforts to transform the industry through the acquisition and 
development of advanced technologies, while certainly economically motivated in 
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part, should be viewed with the same lens. Revitalizing this once robust industry 
is an enabler in Brazil’s grand strategy. 
Brazil’s grand strategy, in the words of Hal Brands, consists of hastening 
“the transition from the dominance of the developed world to a multipolar order in 
which international power balances and institutions are more favorable to the 
assertion of Brazil’s interests.”148 In essence, it entails efforts to secure Brazil’s 
place as a global power. In accordance with this strategy, Brazil has pursued 
certain initiatives that it believes will help it achieve this goal to include 
accumulating traditional hard power capabilities, creating partnerships with its 
South American neighbors to enhance its leadership in the region, and lobbying 
for a permanent seat on the UNSC.149  
Brasília’s efforts to revitalize its defense industry though technology 
transfer can certainly help in these areas. In terms of hard power accumulation, 
the connection is obvious. With a robust domestic defense industry, Brazil will be 
in a position to acquire for its armed forces any weapons system it deems 
necessary for its national defense. It will not be reliant on technology from other 
countries, but will be capable of producing high-technology equipment on par 
with that produced in the developed countries. 
A transformed, high-tech defense industry also supports Brazil’s efforts at 
creating partnerships through the sale of Brazilian weapons systems to its 
neighbors. Just as the United States seeks to sell its weapons systems to 
countries in the region in order to help partner nations acquire and develop the 
capabilities they need to defend themselves, fosters relationships that can be 
called upon in times of conflict, and increases interoperability with U.S. forces, 
Brazil can feasibly do the same in an environment where its defense industry is 
producing equipment at the technological level desired by other nations in the 
region. Brazil could perhaps become the region’s preferred partner, particularly 
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since its weapons sales have imposed fewer constraints on purchasing nations in 
terms of employment of the equipment. 
Finally, a defense (and civilian) industry with the technology to master the 
nuclear fuel cycle could bolster Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. 
This does not mean Brazil will try to develop a nuclear weapon, particularly since 
this is constitutionally prohibited. However, there is certainly a perception among 
some Brazilians regarding the importance of obtaining nuclear capabilities to the 
country’s world power aspirations. As the Brazilian Navy’s Chief of Staff stated in 
2008, “Those who have nuclear submarines sit on the United Nations Security 
Council. All permanent members have the technology, which none of them give 
up. We have to develop our own.”150 Along the same vein, Fabian Callé, a 
security specialist with close ties to the Brazilian defense establishment, noted of 
the emphasis on nuclear power in the 2012 Brazilian defense white paper, “This 
will send a message that Brazil has the capability to produce nuclear weapons, 
thereby matching world powers and making it worthy of a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council.”151 Though there is no guarantee that Brazilian mastery of 
nuclear technology will guarantee an elevated status in the UN, it is clear from 
statements such as these that a hope that such is the case influences Brazilian 
policymakers and drives their desire for greater technology transfer. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of Brazilian defense policy and the role 
of defense technology transfer in that policy. It noted that a study of Brazil’s 
defense policy reveals a recognition among its leaders that the desired 
transformation of both the Brazilian armed forces and the industry that supports 
them will require foreign technological assistance in the near term and 
technological independence in the long term. In concluded that despite criticism 
of and skepticism regarding the Brazilian END, it is a credible policy document 
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and is driving defense activities in Brazil. While economically motivated, Brazil’s 
efforts to revitalize its defense industry via technological acquisition and 
development is best understood in the larger context of Brazil’s grand strategy of 
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IV. KEY UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN US-BRAZIL SECURITY 
COOPERATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
During an October 2010 colloquium, entitled “Brazil’s Security Strategy 
and Defense Doctrine,” former Brazilian Defense Minister Nelsom Jobim 
discussed Brazil’s defense policy and strategy as set forth in the END. At the 
meeting Jobim noted that the three principles elements the country hoped to 
develop were advanced technologies, a space program, and a peaceful nuclear 
capacity; he stressed the point that: 
Brazil is not a country that ‘buys’ hardware, but enters joint venture 
agreements with shared production responsibilities and technology 
transfer, so that in the future it may independently produce its own 
military equipment. Both the space and nuclear programs are 
inexorably linked to the development of advanced technologies.152 
Included in the technologies Brazil hopes to acquire and develop is advanced 
aviation technology, as noted in the previous chapter. As the nuclear and aviation 
realms are key areas for development in Brazil’s defense strategy, this chapter 
will explore cooperation (or lack thereof) between the United States and Brazil in 
those two areas. This focus should shed light on the reasons behind differing 
perceptions regarding technology transfer by policymakers in both countries. 
Following the case presentation, the thesis’s conclusion will be presented. 
A. NUCLEAR 
Brazil’s interest in enhancing its nuclear capacity is not a recent 
development. The country began developing this capacity more than 60 years 
ago, initially with significant assistance from the United States, including the 
provision of nuclear technology. Numerous factors drove the industry’s 
development, including Brazil’s rivalry with Argentina, its energy needs for 
autonomy or self-sufficiency, its world power aspirations, and the Brazilian 
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Navy’s interest in nuclear submarines, to name a few.153 Brazilian interest in its 
nuclear capacity intensified in 1951, when Argentine President Juan Perón 
falsely declared that scientists in his country had mastered the thermonuclear 
process. From that point forward, Brazilian scientists began experimenting with 
nuclear fission, and the government took greater interest in the industry with the 
creation of the National Research Council (Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas) in 
1951 and the establishment of an official nuclear research program under said 
council. Other key institutions were established in the late 1950s to conduct 
nuclear research and train personnel.154  
U.S. assistance helped advance the industry in its early days and up 
through the early 1970s. Following the discovery of vast uranium resources, 
Brazilian President Getulio Vargas signed a number of agreements with the 
United States in the 1940s to jointly exploit these resources in exchange for the 
provision of U.S. nuclear technology. Though the United States blocked the 
shipment of three West German ultra-centrifuges to Brazil in the early 1950s, in 
1955 it signed an agreement with Brazil under the Atoms for Peace program that 
allowed Brasília to purchase several research reactors. Finally, in 1971, Brazil 
contracted with the U.S. firm Westinghouse to construct Brazil’s first nuclear 
power reactor, the 626-megawatt Angra I, in Angra dos Reis, Rio de Janeiro.155  
U.S. support for the Brazilian nuclear program wavered in the mid-1970s, 
and it ceased to transfer nuclear technology to Brazil and actively blocked the 
efforts of other countries to do so. This was related primarily to two factors: 
India’s 1 74 nuclear test and the 1 78 U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. India’s 
test caused Washington to review “its nuclear policy regarding the transfer of 
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sensitive nuclear material to developing countries,”156 eventually leading to the 
passing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which required full-scale safeguards 
on any nuclear transfer from the United States. Additionally, as noted in Chapter 
II, pressure from the Carter administration on Brazil’s military government and 
the linking of U.S. security assistance to a favorable human rights record further 
diminished U.S. support for Brazil’s nuclear program. 
Given these constraints, Brazil was forced to look to other countries 
besides the United States, who had been its preferred partner, for the technology 
and equipment it needed to build its nuclear capacity. After a series of secret 
negotiations, Brasília announced in 1975 that it had reached an agreement with 
West Germany “for a complete nuclear fuel cycle: the construction of two nuclear 
power reactors (and plans for six more in Brazil by 2000) and facilities for 
uranium processing, conversion, enrichment, and reprocessing.”157 The deal did 
not yield the desired results, however, as the West German technology proved to 
be somewhat unreliable, and the United States, which reacted strongly against 
the deal, effectively pressured West Germany to require full nuclear safeguards 
from Brazil. Further limiting Brazil’s ability to develop its program was the full 
implementation of the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. As Sotomayor writes, 
“This contributed to a virtual embargo on suppliers for Brazilian and Argentine 
nuclear industries, irritating both countries in the Southern Cone and 
engendering suspicion in Brazil toward the United States.”158 By 1 7 , the act’s 
requirement that Brazil accept more extensive nuclear safeguards had effectively 
nullified the country’s deal with Westinghouse to provide fuel and technology for 
Angra I. Brazil ultimately determined that the United States could not be counted 
on as a nuclear partner and endeavored to create a secret, parallel nuclear 
program run by the military.159 
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U.S. application of the MTCR is another area related to the nuclear arena 
where U.S. policy has acted to constrain Brazilian initiatives. As discussed in 
Chapter II, the MTCR is a multilateral agreement under which signatories agree 
to control the proliferation of “unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering 
weapons of mass destruction,”160 and the regime’s guidelines indicate a strong 
presumption to deny transfers of the most sensitive items described in the 
agreement. In Brazil, The United States, and The Missile Technology Control 
Regime, Scott Tollefson analyzes Brazil’s efforts to develop ballistic missiles for 
its space program and the effect of U.S. policy on this effort. As with Brazil’s 
nuclear program, the United States aided in the early development of the 
Brazilian space program, providing research rockets in the mid 1960s as well as 
technological and financial support for the Aerospace Technical Center and the 
National Institute of Space Research.161  
However, concerns over Brazil’s nuclear efforts in the late 1 70s and 
1980s and its policy of placing few end-use restrictions on its weapons sales 
caused a shift in U.S. support for the program. Policymakers in Washington 
applied the guidelines of the MTCR in the strictest fashion, effectively denying 
the export of all rocket and ballistic missile technology covered in Categories I 
and II of the agreement, due to concerns that this technology would allow Brazil 
to develop missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. Brazilian officials 
criticized the regime, complaining that it made it impossible “to count on 
arranging the transfer of the most modern foreign technology for the 
development of a medium-range missile."162 Further exacerbating matters, other 
signatories of the agreement, such as France and West Germany, proved willing 
to interpret the MTCR more loosely than the United States, thus casting U.S. 
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application of the agreement in a more negative light.163 Tollefson concludes that 
the United States’ choice to strictly apply the MTCR had:  
1) Strained Brazilian security relations with the United States; 2) 
weakened U.S. influence over Brazil's rocket and missile programs; 
3) strengthened Brazilian ties with European suppliers (especially 
France) of space and missile technology; 4) driven Brazil into closer 
technological cooperation with the PRC and the Soviet Union; and 
5) intensified Brazilian negotiations with Iraq and Libya.164 
Brazil’s recent choice of partner for its nuclear submarine program 
supports Tollefson’s conclusion. When seeking partnership on submarine 
construction in January 2008, Jobim visited France and Russia, not the United 
States. Brazil ultimately chose France as its partner for submarine construction, 
particularly because of its “readiness to transfer submarine design 
technology.”165 The deal with France includes the construction of four 
conventional submarines and one nuclear submarine (with design technology 
included) as well as a joint venture with a Brazilian firm to build a new shipyard 
and naval base for nuclear submarines. The deal does not include the transfer of 
the nuclear reactor technology itself, such as “the design, construction and 
putting into operation of the on-board nuclear reactor, the installations in the 
nuclear reactor compartment, and the equipment and facilities whose functions 
are primarily concerned with the reactor's operation or nuclear safety;”166 these 
will have to come from the Brazilian Navy’s own nuclear program. Nevertheless, 
Brazil’s choice of France and its decision to not seek U.S. partnership for its 
submarine program underscore the relationship between the Washington and 
Brasília in the nuclear arena. In sum, Brazil does not consider the United States 
to be a reliable partner on its nuclear initiatives, be they civilian or military in 
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nature. This is due to U.S. efforts in the past to block Brazil’s nuclear aspirations, 
some of which have been outlined earlier in this section. 
B. AVIATION 
U.S. efforts to cooperate with Brazil and transfer technology in the aviation 
realm in recent years have been more positive than those in the nuclear arena. 
Most of these efforts have been related to Brazil’s FX-2 program. Beginning in 
the early 1990s, the Brazilian Air Force launched the program to replace its aging 
fleet of Mirage fighter aircraft with a fifth generation fighter. The program 
intensified during the Lula administration and particularly after the release of the 
END in 2008, with its emphasis on military modernization and advanced 
technology. As part of the program, Brazil looked to make an initial purchase of 
36 fighter aircraft, with potential for up to 100; in return, it sought significant 
technology transfer from all bidders as well as production in Brazil in order to 
meet the stated goals of the END to acquire and develop advanced technologies 
to reduce its dependence on other countries and revive its defense industrial 
base. By the end of 2008, the bidding process had narrowed to three 
competitors: the French Dassault Rafale, the Swedish Saab Gripen NG, and the 
U.S. Boeing F-18 Super Hornet.167 
By 2009, the U.S. bid appeared to be a distant third behind the French 
and Swedish options. Lobbying efforts by President Sarkozy, offers of substantial 
technology transfer, the submarine deal with Brazil, and willingness to support 
Brazil’s leadership aspirations in multilateral forums, all seemed to favor France 
as Brazil’s partner of choice. The Swedish bid, meanwhile, also included 
substantial technology transfer and offered a significantly lower cost of U.S. $4.5 
billion, compared to U.S. $8 and U.S. $7 billion for the French and U.S. options 
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respectively. Additionally, both the French and Swedish governments had agreed 
to purchase KC-3 0 transport aircraft from Brazil’s Embraer in return for selection 
for the fighter deal. By contrast, the Boeing bid was hampered by a 2006 U.S. 
decision to veto the sale Brazilian Super Tucano aircraft to Venezuela due to the 
presence of U.S. technology in the aircraft. This action certainly gave Brazilian 
officials pause regarding U.S. commitments to technology transfer in Boeing’s 
bid. The Lula administration appeared poised to give the contract to France in 
2010.168 
By 2011, however, the U.S. bid was back in the running. Financial 
challenges leading to cuts in the Brazilian defense budget left the decision 
unmade prior to Lula leaving office. President Rousseff chose to review all three 
offers anew upon taking office, and U.S. officials and Boeing took advantage of 
more time to bolster the F-18 bid. At various high-level meetings, U.S. officials—
including President Obama, Vice President Biden, Secretary of State Clinton, 
and Secretary of Defense Panetta—lobbied the Brazilian government on behalf 
of the Boeing proposal. In April 2012, Panetta promised “the U.S. would permit 
significant technology transfers only reserved for our closest allies and partners if 
Boeing won the competition,”169 and in June 2013, Biden assured President 
Rousseff that “the U.S. Congress was likely to respect Boeing's agreement to 
transfer sensitive technology to Brazil as part of the deal.”170 For its part, Boeing 
also made efforts to bolster the bid and demonstrate its commitment to assist 
Brazil in achieving its strategic objectives. It established an office in Sao Paulo in 
2011, headed by former U.S. ambassador to Brazil Donna Hrinak, and, following 
Panetta’s visit, it announced plans to establish an aerospace research facility in 
Brazil as part of a partnership agreement with Embraer. Also as part of the 
agreement, Boeing agreed to work with Embraer to improve safety, efficiency, 
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and operational costs, supply weapons systems for Embraer’s Super Tucano 
aircraft, and collaborate with Embraer on its KC-390 program, including the 
sharing of technical know-how. These efforts, coupled with the cooperative 
defense agreements signed between the two countries noted in Chapter I, 
elevated the F-18 bid’s status, and by mid 2013, Brasília appeared close to 
selecting the U.S. aircraft.171 
However in late 2013, the Brazilian government announced it had selected 
the Saab Gripen NG for the FX-2. Defense Minister Amorim justified the decision 
stating, “The choice was the object of much study and careful consideration, and 
took into account performance, effective technology transfer and costs, both for 
acquisition and maintenance. The choice was based on these three factors.”172 
Despite Amorim’s claim, there is little doubt that the allegations of the U.S. 
National Security Agency (NSA) spying on Brazilian officials undermined the U.S. 
bid and thus made the decision a political one as much as a technical one. As 
former Brazilian trade secretary commented following the announcement, 
“Boeing only didn’t win the deal because of the lack of trust created by the spying 
incident. . . . Had the decision been last year, Boeing would have won.”173 
Apparently, Boeing had overcome the challenges related to technology transfer 
with its bid for the FX-2, but the fallout from the NSA spying revelations had 
made choosing the U.S. option untenable for Brazilian officials. 
The preceding section demonstrated the positive steps the United States 
has made in recent years to cooperate with Brazil in the aviation realm. These 
steps have included a willingness to transfer significant technology from U.S. 
aircraft that has traditionally only been transferred to its closest partners such as 
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members of NATO. Thus, in recent years, one could argue that the U.S. has 
demonstrated that it can be a reliable partner for Brazil in defense cooperation. 
C. CONCLUSION 
As stated at the outset, the goal of this thesis has been to understand the 
nature of the challenge of technology transfer between the United States and 
Brazil and its effect on bilateral security cooperation. Since 2010, the two 
countries have made efforts to expand security cooperation with the signing of a 
DCA, a GSOMIA, and the establishment of a DCD. Yet despite these positive 
steps, the issue of technology transfer threatens to impede the progress of U.S.-
Brazil security cooperation, with Brazilian leadership lamenting U.S. 
unwillingness to transfer defense technology to Brazil, and U.S. policymakers 
citing figures and efforts that seem to indicate just the opposite.174 
Chapter I of the thesis provided an introduction, an overview of the U.S.-
Brazil bilateral relationship, and some of the historic and current sources of 
friction in said relationship. As noted, the relationship between the U.S. and 
Brazil, while very close at times, has been fraught with unmet expectations and 
misunderstandings on both sides. The issue over defense technology transfer is 
essentially a byproduct of this complicated relationship. Understanding this issue 
is important because finding common ground on technology transfer is 
something both sides desire and could lead to mutual security and economic 
benefits. In a fiscally constrained environment where the U.S. government is 
cutting back on defense expenditures, greater technology transfer to Brazil 
should result in greater sales for U.S. defense companies and help maintain the 
defense industrial base in the United States. Brazilian purchase of U.S. military 
equipment would increase interoperability between the two countries and could 
lead to additional training and exchange opportunities that would likely enhance 
the bilateral relationship, at least at the military-to-military level. For Brazil, it 
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helps them build up their industrial base, potentially creating more employment 
and wealth generated from authorized third-party sales, and supports the 
country’s grand strategy of seeking greater autonomy and increasing its status 
among the world powers. 
Chapter I also presented three potential explanations for differing views 
regarding this issue. The first explanation was that U.S. policymakers are correct, 
that the United States is more than willing to transfer significant technology to 
Brazil, and that the issue is simply a Brazilian ideation. The second hypothesis 
was that Brazilian policymakers are correct, that the United States is unwilling to 
readily transfer defense-related technology to Brazil, and that it carefully keeps 
the most advanced technology from being transferred. The third explanation was 
that both sides are partially wrong (or right) due to misperception of the other’s 
intentions and actions. This thesis concludes that the best explanation for the 
challenge of greater Brazil-U.S. security cooperation vis-à-vis technology transfer 
is the third one, that of misperception. The information presented in subsequent 
chapters bears this out. 
Chapter II provided an overview of U.S. policies that have a bearing on 
defense technology transfer. It concluded that the transfer of arms and 
technology is a sensitive issue, as the decision to do so involves the difficult task 
of balancing often-competing goals of national security, foreign policy, and 
economic prosperity. Additionally, this type of SA is regulated by a robust 
domestic export control system as well as multiple multilateral control regimes. 
U.S. presidents over the years have used the provisions of the export control 
system to formulate their own arms transfer policies and justify restricting exports 
to some regions while permitting them to others in accordance with their foreign 
policies. Thus, while it is certainly constrained to a large extent by the laws in 
place governing transfers of certain arms and technology, it is not difficult for one 
to see how would-be importers of advanced arms and technology such as Brazil 
could believe that the United States is deliberately holding back certain 
technologies from them based on historical antecedents.  
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Chapter III provided an overview of Brazilian defense policy and the role of 
defense technology transfer in that policy. It noted that a study of Brazil’s defense 
policy reveals a recognition among its leaders that a desired transformation of 
both the Brazilian armed forces and the industry that supports them will require 
foreign technological assistance in the near term and technological 
independence in the long term. Brazil’s current efforts to transform its defense 
industry through the acquisition and development of advanced technologies, 
while certainly economically motivated in part, is viewed as an enabler in 
achieving the goals of Brazil’s grand strategy.175 A transformed, technologically 
advanced Brazilian defense industry would allow Brazil to acquire any weapons 
system it deems necessary for its national defense, support its efforts at creating 
partnerships through the sale of Brazilian weapons systems to its Latin American 
neighbors, and could bolster its bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Thus, 
any effort by the United States or any other country that is perceived to block or 
hinder Brazil in obtaining or developing the key technologies identified in the 
END will certainly be poorly received, breed mistrust and discontent, and impede 
the construction of a closer security relationship. Conversely, Brazil’s traditional 
“no-strings” attached approach to arms sales appropriately garners some 
reticence to authorize sensitive technology transfers among U.S. policymakers, 
particularly in the absence of a ratified GSOMIA.176 
The preceding sections of this chapter compared nuclear and aviation 
cooperation between the United States and Brazil, key areas for development 
identified in Brazil’s defense strategy. This comparison is particularly helpful in 
understanding the difference in perceptions in both countries regarding 
technology transfer. As noted in Chapter I, Robert Jervis argues that what 
political actors learn from key historical events, largely determines the way they 
interpret new information. Thus, actors will often struggle to assimilate new 
information that does not support their prevailing view, and may either ignore it or 
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manipulate it to fit their established beliefs. Second, he posits that events are 
more likely to shape present perceptions if they occurred in the “recent rather 
than the remote past.”177 Both of these aspects of misperception are likely at play 
in the Brazil-U.S. security relationship.178  
In the nuclear realm, U.S. support for Brazilian nuclear aspirations has 
been fragmented and unpredictable, going from early support to build the 
industry, to openly blocking Brazilian efforts to procure the necessary equipment 
and technology to reach its nuclear goals for civilian and military applications. 
While this behavior was justified by U.S. fears that Brazil would develop a 
nuclear weapon, it must be understood that this historical backdrop informs the 
way Brazilian policymakers view the technology transfer issue. By contrast, U.S. 
cooperation efforts related to aviation in the past five years, particularly in 
conjunction with Boeing’s bid for the FX-2 contract, have shown a commitment to 
transfer unprecedented levels of high technology to Brazil. It is through the lens 
of these efforts that many U.S. policymakers view the technology transfer issue. 
Thus this thesis concludes that historical events in its relations with Washington 
make it difficult for Brasília to accept more recent U.S. efforts to enhance security 
cooperation and facilitate technology transfer on their face, while these same 
efforts cause U.S. policymakers to discount the importance of past indifference 
towards or overt efforts to block Brazil in obtaining certain technologies. 
As Guedes da Costa writes: 
Mistrust seems to be at the core of the bilateral relationship, and 
U.S. policy-makers need to ask what can be done to overcome it. 
Brazilian policy-makers, at least those that are in power right now, 
have made up their minds about ‘strategic relations’ between the 
United States and Brazil: the U.S. is not the partner of choice.179 
Finding common ground on the technology transfer issue could certainly 
change the state of affairs described above. Doing so, however, will likely take a 
                                            
177 Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics 20, no. 3 (1968): 472. 
178 Ibid.; Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 220. 
179 Guedes da Costa, Grand Strategy for Assertiveness, 12. 
 73 
more concerted effort on the part of both Brazilian and U.S. policymakers. 
Ratification of the DCA and the GSOMIA by the Brazilian Congress can certainly 
facilitate movement on this issue. For their part, U.S. political leaders cannot 
allow themselves to be deterred by the failure of the Boeing FX-2 bid, but should 
continue to seek further cooperation in the aviation realm, even in the face of a 
challenging political relationship caused by the NSA spying revelations. 
Additionally, to truly overcome the view in Brazil that the U.S. is holding back its 
most important technology, U.S. policymakers should explore ways to transfer 
civilian nuclear technology to Brazil. Efforts to reform the U.S. export control 
system under President Obama may facilitate this happening. Additionally, the 
United States should seek opportunities to assist Brazil with technology that 
augments its capabilities in the other strategic areas identified in the END: space 
and cyber. So doing could create the bilateral security relationship both sides 
desire and contribute to enhanced peace and security in the hemisphere. 
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